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Abstract 
The United States and its partners in the war on terrorism have respond 
ed to the terrorist attacks with a three-pronged strategy - short run mili-
tary, medium term aid to vulnerable countries and groups, and longer term 
assistance programs that directly focus on !he sources of terrorist motiva-
tion. Using Pakistan as a case study, it appears that the best way to imple· 
ment the medium and longer term phases are assistance for education 
reform in the medium term, with the focus on institutional reform, and 
governance strengthening in the longer term. In most cases, grants are 
superior to aid in assuring effective and efficient implementation of the 
country's assistance related programs. 
Keywords: terrorism, Foreign Aid, Pakistan, education reform, economic 
development 
Introduction 
In the Autumn of 2001, as United States troops launched their 
attack on Afghanistan's ruling Taliban, a battle of an entirely differ-
ent sort was being planned in Washington. This campaign did not 
receive as much attention, but it was no less important, because it 
involved winning new allies in the war on terrorism with humanitar-
ian relief for millions of refugees, and financial assistance for eradi-
cating poverty through higher rates of economic growth in key region-
al countries. 
The events of September 11 made it painfully clear that the politi-
cal, social and economic problems of other countries have a direct 
impact on American national security. The United States was 
attacked by a terrorist organization that in large part has had great 
success in recruiting new members in nations which offer young men 
little political voice and limited economic opportunity. 
\ 
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With this in mind the United States and its coalition partners have 
responded to the terrorist attacks with a three-pronged strategy -
short run military, medium term aid to vulnerable countries and 
groups and longer term assistance programs that directly focus on the 
sources of terrorist motivation .. The first task has been generally suc-
cessfully completed while the seco.nd is only, in 'the initial stages of 
implementation. In all likelihood however these initi.al successes must 
also carry to the second and third medium- to longer-term strategies 
to assure the ultimate defeat of{\! Qaeda and like-minded groups. 
Initial Aid Response 
Prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Administration;s 
top foreign aid initiatives for the·2002 fiscal year had been combating 
the spread .of HIV/J\IDS .and.. othel'illf'ectious diseases, fighting pover-
ty, broadening tjie public/private partn~rship .in aid programming, 
and expanding the counter~narcotics campaign in the Andean region. 
With· the; focus :now on anti-Terrorism measures, these issues have 
bad much less of a priority. ;. . . . ' ,. . 
. . ' 
'!I', I ·' 
A .main concern from the 'beginning was Pakistan which borders 
Afghanistan's entire southern rim and contains critical access routes 
to the country. Virtually all US aid to the country had been cut off 
after the Pakistanis revealed they had conducted nuclear. weapons 
tests in 1998. · 
··'lb enlist Pakistan's assistance in fighting terrorism, the Bush 
administration asked (September 22) Congress for blanket authority 
to wave economic ~anctions against countries whose help is needed in 
the anti~terror coalition .. Congress quickly granted a limited form of 
such ·authority .. Four.· days . l!;lter the International Monetary . Fund, 
where the US.has the largest share of votes,.approved a $135 million 
loan for Pakistan even though the country was inarrears on servicing 
its $37 billion national debt. The Treasury .Department then 
announced it would ease. terms on $379. million .of Pakistan's debt .to 
the United States, setting the stage for other nations to follow. ,· · , . 
On October.15 in Islamabad, the United.States.announced that it 
would provide $600 millipn in aid to the country in fiscal year 2002, a 
figure that later rose to $673 .million. On.November. l01il?resident 
Bush said that long-term aid for Pakistan <;ould total as much as one 
billion dollars. The funds for the Bush administration's foreign ~d ipi~ 
tiatives in the immediate aftermath of Septemb'er 11 cameJrom.:the 
$40 billion supplemental appropriations bill C~ngress passed on 
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September 18, 2002. The administration quickly pulled together a 
$1.06 billion aid package' out of those funds, covering the aid packages 
for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and millions more for the four former 
Soviet states of Afghanistan's northern rim: Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: 
United States Aid Allocation for FY 2002 (million$) 
Country Before September 11 
Afghanistan $2.9 
Pakistan 10 .5 
Kazakhstan 51.5 
Kyrgyzstan 32.0 











For 2003, the President's Budget included $5.2 billion for programs 
that were essential in pursuing the war on terrorism. 
The President's use of aid in fighting terrorism was reaffirmed by 
Senate Resolution 204 in early February 2002. This resolution 
expressed the sense of the Senate regarding the importance of United 
States foreign assistance programs as a diplomatic tool for fighting 
global terrorism and promoting United States Security interests. 
In this resolution the Senate noted that: 
(1) United States foreign assistance programs 'should play an 
increased role in the global fight against terrorism to comple-
ment the natural security objectives of the United States; 
(2) The United States should lead coordinated international efforts 
to provide increased financial assistance to countries with 
impoverished and disadvantaged populations that are the 
breeding grounds for terrorism; 
(3) Consistent with United States foreign policy, economic incen-
tives should be used to end state support or tolerance for ter-
rorism; and 
(4) The United States Agency for International Development and 
the Department of Agriculture should substantially increase 
humanitarian, economic development, and agricultural assis-
tance to foster international peace and stability and the promo-
tion of human rights. 
In short, the US foreign assistance is enjoying a new lease on life 
as it is being looked upon by the Administration as an effective, high-
ly visible tool in the early days of the anti-terrorism campaign. 
\ 
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Clearly; theAdministratiOn and Congress feei th~t1~a has the poten· 
tilil· ~··'streri~hen ·ecoriomic':~iid poUtiCa:l'~t~btUty·:of tµose· govern.~ 
ments that cooperate 'with Washington whil~ respqndirig tC? humani~ 
tarianneeds>· · ..r:<·•"n"''" • ,,,,,i./~nHiH,;1.1\ .;::• ·'· ;;·:· 
. \r • ~ ,,, ~ -~ • ; 
Most of the pieqe~ of th~_init~al aid campajgn "{ere in pl~ce within 
the crucial 10 ·weeks .. -after. ~eptembet ·11{\US .otncials · then .'started 
looking.~ the: next phase/~hfoh is likely tO last much longer 'an4'be 
much more expensive. The r,~construction plan for Afghanistajl 'a\one, 
will more than likely cost anywhere from $6 to UO. bilUoi>.. 
Implementation will take year.a to complete. ··· ······ · · 
Medium Term Aid Strategy.Jor P!lkistan 
Focusing oh Pakistan; US medium term assistance could conceiv-
ably take a number of forms: (1) increased keneral 'aid for budgetary 
support for anti•poverty;programs; (~) additional-debt relief"""' this 
could involve outright debt forgiveness as well· as a restructuring of 
· much• of Pakistan's short term foreign obligations;.(S)·special access 
for PakistantO"'the.·us market for textiles;.;... using a long-terin sched· 
ule expanding ·Pakistan's share of the US unpijrt market;· (4) a long-
term US18id coniiriitmenffor strengthening governance. and institu~ 
tionalchange. (5) educational assistance, and (6) resumption of a long 
'term military assistance·to Pakistan.· · ··· 
~·-f_.1..)dJ t·~:h_(;,:~:J :1·\;. ?·.!ii.: .~t! 
n~ilQcr~asecJ., ai<l for ~ti,-p9verty.program~; debt .relief; and expanded 
nlilitarY 'assistanceYfor, :Pakistan are· .obvious, a:tearf, on ·,which the 
United . States ... could· focus> Less ;apparenthbut •·perhaps . even more 
itnpoft~nt we <tUJ:'. ;a~*>t\S; jrftwo lceY. a.rj;las: .. ~Q.H,catjqn,~l refol'm. and 
goverilaµ.ce/i.n,stitutipnaj stl'~l,lgtb,en.il'.}g,. ~ ·w,s~~j!"ed ~elQ.W, one thing 
botharea~ ~~vejp ~9~'?l.9n i§.tpatdHl?Qj~ .t~r 1!9.~ew:Q.M ~iff'ez:~:µt ways, 
they• are fertile breeding gi:9µnd~ .. fQt?"cl\f3.(:.Q~tent 1 ~.anci anti-
Alllericanism .. :The Jollomug ,se~tion focuses Pn . what the . United 
S~tes. might ~o to faciHtate edu~~tionaJ refori:P.Jn P.akis~an. .. . . 
; '. ~\'': • (,·'.,.~I-.·., I'·· .•. -~/';·'+•' r' ,),,.- 0 ,-,. , ·',·.-· •'-J -,j,'~-<~J "'., ,,.J· .''•'-'.i'· 1, O' ?\ 
Educational System.·.. ·' 
·:,·J,1: ,,; ... ::•.ft•:·~,--:,.'. l~'}i;tl)i.;:.;:i.i ~ ~ ,'. i ;., 
One. of ¥e. t@qu~·· charac~ristics 'of th~'Pakistruii ec}ucatiorial sys-
tem.· is· .W~~:_re,l\ap~e,\:,op·:·re~igi~u~: sc~o~~~·::~~§m9Pjy'?.~~~~n •·as 
· Madrassahs.' ·Historically these schools' wer~ '.founded ·as' centres of 
learning for the next· gene:rati9n of Islaniic"'l1choiaf's:"~d· clerics .. As 
s41ge;r C?QQ.1) n,9tes, :ti<.>~ev.er; .c1~g ~he )~§Os.~}\e,~,a~*S~l:lll ,SY~tem. _.· 
chan ed. sf 'fic'aritl:'Ffrst ·a's. art'ofitS Tsl~rliiZatfo '1',1 ' licf"'thi{Zial' r~, ·.·r!e ·aiES~d iH " ~iictlir1 t<>'t Jiie"sc~dO~J.:"·wndi3'w~irw~· rersJd "Kt th~ local 1:!1 'to fn~tittlti~nsi d~~me<i ·\votthy of'~~i>i>oH "lt,yft~ligioJ~ 
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leaders, creating new incentives for opening religious schools. At the 
same time, the war in Afghanistan produced millions of refugees and 
the radicalism of a jihad movement. 
Today, the schools are funded both by private donations from 
Middle Eastern countries and by the "zakat, ~ a 2.5 percent tax col-
lected by the Pakistani government from the bank accounts of Sunni 
Muslims once a year. The tax results in millio:i;is of dollars each year 
are directed to. the schools. Foreign donations come mainly from rich 
individuals and Islamic charities in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. 
A major reason for the popularity of the Madrassahs in Pakistan is 
that the country's public school system is in a shambles, and many 
families cannot afford the small fees that are charged. Madrassahs 
offer an attractive alternative: free education, free meals, free school-
books and even in some cases a stipend. While the exact numbers are 
unobtainable, estimates are that over a million and a half students 
study at more than 10,000 of these schools. ·' 
A number - probably a significant fraction - of these schools have 
built extremely close ties with radical militant groups. In this capaci-
ty they have increasingly played a critical role in sustaining the inter-
. national terrorist network. In addition to their role in terrorism, the 
schools are a concern because of their non-technical, non-scientific 
curriculum. Many teach only religious subjects to their students, 
focusing on rote memorization of Arabic texts. In essence they are pro-
ducing a generation of students unlikely to play a productive role in 
creating the type of modern dynamic economy necessary to reduce the 
country's grinding poverty. 
Educational Reform 
For its part the government is trying to revamp the country's school 
system, together with weeding out extremist Islamic educators. To 
this end, on June 19, 2002 the federal cabinet approved the 
Madrassah Registration Ordinance 2002, in force immediately, to reg-
ulate religious schools by bringing them under the formal educational 
system of the country. According to the ordinance, Madrassahs must 
register with the Pakistan Madrassah Education Board and the 
respective Provincial Madrassah Education Boards. A key aspect of 
the Ordinance is that unregistered Madrassahs will be prohibited 
from receiving Zakat funds, financial assistance, grants, donations or 
other benefits from the federal go~ernment or provincial governments. 
Madrassahs violating the Ordinance risk closure or a tine or both. 
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The government is also trying to persuade the schools to teach sci-
ence, mathematics, English and Urdu. This would provide students 
with the option, now usually lacking, of eventually enrolling in pro-
fessional schools. The government has gone so far as to suggest that 
Madrassahs would receive government aid only if they begin provid-
ing what could be termed a "modern education". 
According to the Ordinance every registered Madrassah is to main-
tain accounts and submit an animal report to their provincial educa-
tion board. A registered Madrassah must not receive any grant, dona-
tion or aid from any foreign sources, or allow admission to foreign stu-
dents or make appointment of teachers without a valid visa and a "No 
Objection Certificate" from the Interior Ministry. 
The country's Madrassah plan is ambjtious and very necessary. But 
by itself it will take years before the effects start to show. It is already 
apparent that change will not come soon to the Madrassahs. Not only 
are many religiou$ groups violently opposed to any government inter-
ference, but the Ordinance is not compulsory. In practice, because of 
pressure from· the clergy, the only penalty for not registering a 
Madrassah is that it will not be eligible to receive any government 
funding. Even this limited incentive is undercut by the fact that most 
of the schools receive little or no government funding to begin with. In 
August of 2002 after intensive lobbying by clergy leaders, the 
Musharraf Administration has pledged to water down the Ordinance. 
Given the limited reforms likely in the Madrassahs in the near 
future, the United States and other donor countries should seriously 
consider using foreign aid and assistance to facilitate educational 
reform in Pakistan. As a start, the United States provided nearly $35 
million in 2002 to bolster the country's state school system. Now, the 
critical questions involve the most effective and efficient ways to pro-
ceed. 
Singer has explored several of the options that might be worth con-
sidering. Logically, the United States could help the Pakistani gov-
ernment with one or more of the following options: 
• Developing a public Madrassah system as an alternative to the 
current private ¥adrassahs. 
• Developing a secular public educatiOn system that provides 
Pakistani families -with a superior ~lternative to .the 
Madrassahs. ,. 
' 
• Developing alternatives and supplements outside the formal 
educational system 
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• Obtaining educational aid from a variety of international 
sources. 
Option 1, given the country's limited supply of educational facilities 
and qualified teachers, might appear to be an attractive short term 
solution. As Singer notes, publicly managed Madrassahs exist 
throughout the Middle East, teaching the tenets of Islam, but also 
providing a more modern curriculum. The United States could help in 
this effort, but should do nothing to imply direct American influence 
over the schools, which would discredit their Muslim credentials. 
Here, US aid should focus mainly on providing various educational 
materials and supplies. A major problem is that the schools would be 
hard to monitor for performance, and given the constraints on the role 
that the United States could play here, this may not be the best 
avenue through which to focus US .efforts. 
Option 2 would definitely entail considerable US aid and assis-
tance. However, rough co~t calculations iri'dicate that this might be a 
promising option. Estimates are that the United States could build a 
school for several hundred children for $60,000 and operate it for 
$10,000 a year. This would appear to be an extremely cost effective 
alternative. 
A final alternative noted by Singer, Option 3, would largely involve 
expanded American sponsorship of technical schools and other centers 
of learning within Pakistan. No doubt this would be a popular alter-
native for many students. As the government's economic reforms 
begin to bear fruit the demand for trained and skilled graduates will 
grow rapidly. More importantly, without a steady stream of qualified 
graduates, the country would have a hard time restoring growth in 
the 5-6% per annum range. 
With regard to Option 4, many other international organizations 
are prepared to assist Pakistan's attempts at improving public educa-
tion. The problem is that often the country does not meet all the con-
ditions to qualify for this assistance. For example, the World Bank has 
recently named Pakistan and 22 other developing nations in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America to spearhead a campaign to educate all chil-
dren by 2015. Unfortunately Pakistan, together with India, 
Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria, cur-
rently falls short of the Bank's minimum criteria for receiving finan-
cial aid. The Bank has set two requirements for countries seeking 
financing: they must have a fully developed "poverty reduction strat-
egy"; and they must be effectively implementing ~,education pl~· 
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that donor nations have agreed to. As part of its relationship with the 
IMF, Pakistan currently has a poverty reduction strategy in place. 
The US contribution could be useful in helping the Pakistani govern-
ment develop a comprehensive educational plan that could draw 
financing not just from the World Bank but also from other interna-
tional agencies and NGOs. 
Educational reform will be one of Pakistan's most important chal-
lenges in the months and years ahead. Fortunately, the country has a 
number of viable options for moving away from the current dysfunc-
tional system. Pakistan's progress in this area may be the most criti-
cal determinant of whether the country becomes a moderate, progres-
sive nation joining the world community, or whether it descends into 
increased poverty, isolation, and instability. 
Longer Term Aid Strategy for Pakistan 
Clearly the Madrassahs are a breeding ground of militant Islam in 
Pakistan making educational assistance a top priority. With regard to 
other types of aid for Pakistan, the situation is not as obvious. Burki 
(2002) notes that the important question is not what kind of presence 
Al Qaeda has established in Pakistan. 'The real issue is how some seg-
ments of society can be weaned away from the type of thinking repre-
sented by Al Qaeda. Unless that is done, Pakistan will not be able to 
achieve either economic or political stability.' At issue then is on what 
objectives should aid be focused? Does terrorism breed in an environ-
ment of dire poverty as is now quite prevalent in Pakistan? Or is it 
more likely to take hold in an environment of dashed expectations and 
limited opportunity of economic success for not only the common man, 
but the educated as well? - an environment that characterizes the 
plight of many Pakistanis. 
Root Causes of Terrorism 
As for the underlying causes of terrorism, initial post-9/11 specula-
tion focused on poverty and low educational attainment as critical ele-
ments. With time and more rigorous research a different picture has 
emerged. Krueger and Maleckova's (2002) detailed and in-depth 
review of the evidence, on the other hand, provides little reason for 
optimism that a reduction in poverty or an increase in educational 
attainment, by themselves, -would meaningfully reduce international 
terrorism. Their main finding is that any connection between poverty, 
low educational attainment, and terrorism is indirect, complicated, 
and probably quite weak. Instead of viewing terrorism as a direct 
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response to low market opportunities or ignorance, they suggest it is 
more accurately viewed as a response to political conditions and long-
standing feelings (either perceived or real) of indignity and frustration. 
This finding is consistent with a recent United Nations Association 
of the National Capital Area (UNANCA) which notes that al Qaeda 
leaders and the September 11 participants were also affected by the 
following factors: · 
1. Widespread feelings of humiliation and decline from past high 
achievements of Islam throughout the Arab countries. 
2. Broad acceptance throughout the Middle East of the funda-
mentalist message that the reason for the plight of Middle 
Eastern countries is that they and their governments have 
reverted to pre-Islamic barb~sm by falling away from the orig-
inal principles of Islam. 
3. Despair over sagging economies, high unemployment, poor edu-
cation, and low technological and' scientific achievement in 
Middle Eastern countries. 
4. Hatred for ineffective, often corrupt, authoritarian, predomi-
nantly secular· Middle Eastern governments, which pay lip ser-
vice to the tenets of fundamentalist Islam, but are reluctant to 
put it into practice and often suppress fundamentalists by force. 
5. Resentment against the United States for its highly visible, 
seemingly unquestioning support of some Arab governments. 
6. Resentment against the USA and other Western countries for 
their claimed arrogance, secular materialism, history of colonial 
domination, political manipulation and interference in support 
of corrupt governments; for civilian casualties from US-UK mil-
itary actions and Western economic sanctions in Iraq; and also 
for Western material success while Islamic governments fail. 
7. Resentment against the USA for its support of Israel; resent-
ment against Israel itself for its treatment of the Palestinians, 
for repeatedly defeating Arab armies and clearly demonstrating 
the inferiority of these armies, and for prospering far more than 
Arab countries. 
Economic Constraints 
Clearly many of these frustrations are playing out in Pakistan as 
many in that country have grown frustrated with the inability of the 
country's political leaders to build and maintain an economic system 
capable of sustaining respectable rates of ec,,onomic growth. 
Historically, Pakistan grew faster than the South Asi(l average by an7 
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average of two percent in the 1960s and 1970s, and at similar rates 
through the 1980s. Since 1993, Pakistan's groWth has been below the 
regional average. In contrast, after ·starting slowly, growth in South 
Asia as a whole has been steadily accelerating for the four decades 
(Looney, 2001). In short, with the exception of a spurt in the 1980s, 
trends in growth in Pakistan have been steadily slowing from initial-
ly very high levels since the 1960s. ·.At that tjme, many observers 
thought the country had taken off in the Rostow (1960) sense - indus~ 
trialization was proceeding rapidly and the agricultural sector was 
experiencing a revolution in productivity gains. To a lesser extent, the 
1980s also represents a failed take-off. 
William Easterly (2001) has. termed Pakistan's experience as an 
illustration ()f a 'growth without development' phenomena. Easterly's 
main point is that the country's poor social indicators have lowered 
the productive potential economy and its ability to service its high 
debt .. His observations are suggestive , of possible explanations for 
Pakistan's failed take-offs, together with a fairly respectable overall 
growth rate of 5.4% 9ver the 1961-2001 period. It may be that a cer-
tain degree. of development and growth was attainable with .. skilled 
managerial elite and ,unskilled workers, but over time, this strategy 
ran into diminishing returl),s, as human capital did not grow at the 
same rate as the other factors. While not definitive,' this explanation 
is consistent with the slowdown in growth from the late 1980s to the 
present. 
• Along these lil\es, Shahid Husain (2001) has attributed the coun-
try's inability to s~stairi high growth to the follqwing factors:. ' 
' • ' An increase in the role of the state has coincided With a decline 
in goyerJ:?.ance. .. , , . , 
• Non-cop),petitiye. regimes politically and. economically have 
. resulted in ramp~nt corruption and s~agnation -the sl,l,bversion 
of competitiv~11es~· was the central, featlir~ of Pakistani govern-
ments. · , · · · · · . . 
• There has been a continuous redistribution of wealth in favour 
of privileged groups. 
• A hard crust of economic monopoly has stifled new growth and 
creativity. 
• An erosion in the provision of public services has resulted in a 
decline of the· !public's trust ·in government. which is seen as 
predatory. This, in turn; is linked to non-payment of taxes, the 
corruption in tax administration, and the massive increase in 
borrowing. · ' .; · 
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• The quality of the civil bureaucracy is falling rapidly. A majori-
ty of civil servants., are not even paid a living wage and this is 
tantamount to an incentive to corruption. 
• The irrelevance of the state in the lives of the people is exem-
plified by the total breakdown of law and order. 
• The inability and unwillingness of the state to discharge its 
social services has meant a vacuum in social services. 
Pakistan's literacy rate has remained almost unchanged since 
Independence. The dependence on madrassahs is hence under-
standable. 
From this, Hasain correctly concludes that little economic progress, 
let alone a take-off, can be made in the country until the government 
is able to re-establish its presence in the political, social, and econom-
ic lives of the people. 
These patterns of failed take-off, failed government economic man-
agement and long run decline suggest that Pakistan is a classic exam-
ple of a couhtry fulfilling Krueger and Male'ckova's description of a 
terrorist breeding ground. Clearly, large segments of the population 
have become weary and frustrated with the country's lack of econom-
ic progress, especially now that the Indian economy is pulling away 
with a much higher and accelerating rate of growth. 
Implications for United States Aid 
While the analysis above makes a strong case for Pakistan's terror-
ism problems being an outgrowth of widespread frustration over the 
country's economic failures and lack of opportunity and economic free-
dom (Looney, 1997), the two other commonly cited sources of terror-
ism, poverty and the militant Islam, noted in the section on education 
are no doubt also contributing factors and need to be addressed. 
However, it is unlikely that focusing on them exclusively will signifi-
cantly reduce the seeming attractiveness of terrorism. 
Instead, assistance needs to focus on the policy changes and insti-
tution-building needed to put the economy on a high growth path. 
Here, United States aid can make a significant contribution by assist-
ing the government attack the root causes of terrorism - those ele-
ments that define the diversionary economy and currently suppress 
economic freedom. In targeting these areas (Figure 1), contributions 
(dotted lines in Figure 1) toward reducing poverty and the numbers of 
Islamic militants would occur simultaneously. 
\ 
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Ffgure'l; Source8'b(1e~rortsm iJ!. P&kistan: hnplications for 
Foreign ASaifstanc.:(" '' '' ~ ·. , .' ·' · . . ''· .· · · . 
..!~] :<\§' •: .''.· 
Ordinary aid towards institution building, anti-corruption and the 
like· might ·face:· strong domestic obstacles/-However; · in Pakistan's 
case, the· Musharraf:anti-corruption · and jnstitutional strengthening 
reforms are'already in place and are appropriate for the war against 
terrorism'~ they ,;simply -need to . be adequately , funded and· imple: 
m.e!\ted. ~·a tesult; ,the :United States woµld not' be perceived a:s try~ 
ing to. impose a foreign set ofinstitutions on the countcy; 1The' overall 
guideline for allocating assistance should be.simple and direct: is this 
progr1;1.m assisting the country in moving tOwards' a choice based ·sys~ 
tem? " 
.-. . 
' ' ' . . . . . -
This approach is 8.lso consistent with the objectives 'laid out in the 
country's new Five·Year:Plan to raise the GDP growth rate tO 6 per-
cent by' June 30, 2005·(Naqvi, 2003). To achieve this the government 
has targeted six key areas: (1) political stability; (2) regional stability; 
(3) a better law and order situatio11; ( 4) i the continuance of fiscal 
responsibility;._ tfght control over budget deficits; (5) ·economic policies 
have tO remain consistent and transparent; and · ( 6) the ·structural 
reforms program must actually be adhered to and co~pleted . 
.. · J. • .. ·;_ .,:· '.:.-~-. \: ~:·; -~ .. ~ ·p_ .:';<~:~ ,. _ ': .. I·:_~ _ ·., ~- _ ~ 1_.1 1 _· ;·. !'1,: ·:" • 
1
l .. ·"'~,J t:.._,_··r;L _ :.:·; ·> ~ ~-- ,.: .
1
.- • ., ·-' : . 
: The key remaining· issue surrounds the type of assistance ....: should 
it be int the form of lrl~, with a stipulated rate of interest or an. outright 
grant. For individual projects, the logi<; is straightforward. , 1 , 
';' ,'-) 
1 Grants are a gift With strings attached; Counter to the usuru policy 
of lending blanket sums· for indeterminate government plans/gr~ts 
are usually· project-linked' and ·executed ·under competitive bid;· For 
the easily quantified basic needs that improve the quality of life and 
\ 
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are the preconditions for economic growth ~ health, primary educa-
tion, and ,water . sa~ta~ion ""'., the grant system would count by inde-
pendent audit and pay for output: numbers of babies vaccinated, chil-
dren that can read and water and sewer services delivered to villages. 
No results: no funds expended. No funds are to be diverted to off-shore 
bank accounts, vanity projects or private je~. 
The Bush.Administration. is. already moving. in these directions. In 
addition to its growing preference .for 'grants, the President's recent 
speech at.the United Nations March 2002 conference on financing for 
development in Monterrey, Mexico, emphasized the importance of 
sound economic policies and the encouragement of enterprise. He 
promised that countries which adopt the right policies will get more 
aid from the United States. 
For the type of institutional loans under consideration here, the sit-
uation is more complicated because output is harder to measure and 
there would be no real 'scope for ¢0mpetitive bids to provide the con-
tracted outputs. Traditional aid often' failed in ' th~se situations 
because there·wa:s noDiearis to enforce penfilties for failure to perform 
and often no real incentives on the part of the recipient country to con-
tinue or even start the reform process. One alternative in the current 
context would be to make short-term ~onces'sfonal loaris conditional 
on institutional rerotm.: Progress (a~ judged by annual ,independent 
audit) could be rewarded with an extension of the. cocessional loan. 
Poor implementation would trigger immediate .rep~yment. Because 
the grant element of a concessional loan mcreases as the loan's matu-
nty increases, the Pakistalii government w.oUid have a real incentive 
to follow through to successful implementation. As an added incentive 
a clause could be included converting the concessional loan into a 
grant upon successful completion of the reform. 
Conclusions 
Clearly military actions together with foreign aid/grant programs 
provide an effective start to abating the Al Queda threat. It is clear, 
however, that the ultimate defeat of Al Queda and similar groups will 
require the elimination of the appeal of terrorist motivation to poten-
tial adherents. Fighting the sources of terrorist motivation will call 
for comprehensive international cooperation in support of long-term 
political, economic and social programs in many Middle Eastern coun-
tries and Pakistan aimed at affecting and modifying the values and 
convictions which have motivated the suicide bombers and at drying 
up the support for al Qaeda and similar organizations. Aid can play 
1a P11mc111r1nr11id1 Vol. 10 & 11 
an etrective'role here, but Will require the restructUring of traditional 
assistance programs tQ' deal not only 'with poverty and growth but 
with a whole set of broader issues. · · 
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